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Abstract—In this paper, we propose an enhanced version of
the HB-MP authentication protocol, called the HB-MP+ protocol.
The HB-MP protocol is a lightweight authentication protocol that
is suitable for use in passive radio frequency identification (RFID)
systems. The HB-MP+ protocol overcomes the man-in-the-middle
attack to which the basic HB-MP protocol is vulnerable while
maintaining its suitability to low-cost passive RFID systems. We
show an effective man-in-the-middle attack against the HB-MP
protocol where the attacker utilizes the predictable rotation of
the secret key. We enhance the HB-MP protocol by randomizing
the rotation of the secret key, which eliminates the vulnerability.
We also propose the use of round keys that may be produced by
rotation or, more generally, by a one-way function. We analyse
the security and performance improvements of our HB-MP+
protocol and find it to be suitable for passive RFID systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio frequency identification (RFID) systems have gener-
ated great interest in recent years and RFID tags are poised
to replace barcodes in the near future. Since the cost of RFID
tags is among the biggest impediments to widespread use, the
computing power and resource of RFID tags are expected to
remain extremely limited. Hence the algorithms and protocols
used in RFID systems are required to be extremely efficient.
However, the security features needed in RFID systems are
almost the same as needed in other systems: authenticity,
integrity, confidentiality, untraceability and availability.
In 2001, Hopper and Blum [3] proposed an authentication
protocol to meet the demand of human authentication, known
as the HB protocol. The HB protocol relies on the computation
hardness of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem,
and uses only dot products of binary vectors and a random
noise bit, so it is very lightweight. In 2005, Juels and Weis [4]
adopted this HB protocol into RFID systems because of the
similarity between human and tags. The authors also presented
an active attack on the HB protocol, and they proposed an
enhanced version called the HB+ protocol. Later in the same
year, Katz and Shin [9] proved the parallel concurrent security
property of the HB and HB+ protocols, but their proofs only
imply meaningful security for ε < 1/4. Follow on work done
by Katz and Smith [10] extend the proofs of security for the
full HB and HB+ protocols for arbitrary ε < 1/2. Unfortu-
nately These two protocols were shown by Gilbert et al. [5] to
be vulnerable to certain man-in-the-middle attacks. In 2006,
Bringer et al. [11] proposed an enhancement of HB+ called
HB++. Piramuthu [7] had a survey of the HB-family protocols
and proposed another modification of the HB+ protocol, in
which the bit-wise rotations are varied for each round and
the message flow is simplified (saving one bit per round). In
2007, Duc and Kim presented a variation of HB+ protocol
called HB∗, which is resistant to Gilbert et al.’s attack [12],
But Piramuthu [8] broke HB∗ and proposed his modified
protocol. In 2008, Gilbert et al. [6] proposed their thorough
analysis on the HB protocol families and proposed two new
protocols called RANDOM-HB# and HB#: RANDOM-HB#
avoids many practical drawbacks of HB+, remains provably
resistant to attacks in the model of Juels and Weis [4], and
is also provably resistant to a broader class of active attacks.
However, RANDOM-HB# is required to store two random
matrices, which make the storage costs insurmountable to
the tags. HB# enhanced RANDOM-HB# by using Toeplitz
matrices [13][14] to improve the performance. At the time
when this paper is written, the latest paper on improvement of
HB+ is the “Trusted-HB” protocol, which uses a LFSR-based
Toeplitz hashing [13] to enhance the security of HB+.
In early 2007, Munilla and Peinado [1] proposed a promi-
nent protocol called HB-MP. The HB-MP protocol has a fresh
way of exchanging messages and improved attack resistance
whilst retaining the simplicity of the HB family. However, the
protocol is still vulnerable and an improved countermeasure
is discussed within this paper.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section II, the LNP
problem and the HB+ Protocol are introduced and analysed,
this prepares the discussion in subsequent sections. In Section
III, we introduce an early step of the HB-MP protocol and
a man-in-the-middle attack that effectively breaks it. Section
IV introduces the HB-MP protocol which had some measures
added to defend against this attack. It furthermore describes the
vulnerability of HB-MP protocol which could enable the attack
mentioned in section III. Section V proposes an improved
HB-MP protocol to resist such attack. Section VI proposes a
general form of HB-MP+ protocol. Section VII gives security
and performance analysis of the HB-MP+ protocol.
II. LPN PROBLEMS AND HB+ PROTOCOL
A. LPN Problems
All the protocols of the HB family are based on the
conjectured hardness of the Learning Parity in the Presence
of Noise, or LPN problem. Here we offer the definition of the
LPN problem:
LPN Problem: The LPN problem with security
parameters q, k, η with η ∈ (0, 1/2) is defined as
follows: given a random q × k binary matrix A, a
random k-bit vector x, a vector v such that |v| ≤ ηq,
and the product z = A · x ⊕ v, find a k-bit vector
x′ such that |A · x′ ⊕ z| ≤ ηq, where |v| denotes the
Hamming weight of vector v.
The LPN problem is known to be NP-Hard [2]; currently no
polynomial algorithm is known to solve the LPN problem.
Hopper and Blum [3] and Juels and Weis [4] cited the
BKW algorithm which is considered to be fastest in solving
LPN problem. However in Gilbert et al. [6], the authors
used the results from other researchers, conclude the former
way of defining security parameters of LPN problem needs
adjustment, as the BKW algorithm is improved significantly.
For example, it was thought that a LPN problem has the
length of the secret k = 224 and the noise level η = 0.25
could achieve around 80-bit security. Unfortunately Gilbert et
al. [6] cited new research showing that, using the new BKW
algorithm, k = 224 and η = 0.25 can only offer a security
level no more than 52 bit. They conservatively proposed that
k = 512 and η = 0.25 should provide a good security level.
B. HB+ Protocol
Since Juels and Weis [4] introduced the HB+ Protocol,
considerable research interests were generated and several
protocols based on this protocols were introduced in the
previous section. Since the HB-MP protocol is also inspired
by HB+ Protocol, it is necessary to have a brief introduction to
this protocol. Some notation will aslo be introduced which are
consistent with that used in Munilla and Peinado’s paper [1].
k length of the secret keys shared by the reader and the tag.
x, y k bits secret keys shared by the reader and the tag.
a, b random k-bits binary vectors.
v noise bit; v = 1 with probability η ∈ [0, 1/2].
⊕ XOR operation.
a · x scalar product of vector a and x
q Number of rounds in an authentication session
TABLE I
NOTATIONS FOR HB+ PROTOCOL
Step 1. The tag chooses at random a k-bit binary vector b,
and sends it to the reader.
Step 2. The reader generates at random a challenge a and
send it to the tag.
Step 3. The tag computes z = a · x⊕ b · y⊕ v and sends z.
Step 4. The reader checks whether z = a · x⊕ b · y.
The HB+ protocol runs q rounds and Fig.1 shows one
round. If the non-match rounds exceeds a threshold t, the tag
READER TAG
(x, y)(x, y)
a
b
Check if z = a · x ⊕ b · y
Compute z = a ·x⊕ b ·y⊕v
z
Blind Factor
Challenge
Response
Fig. 1. A Round of HB+ Protocol
is rejected and otherwise it will be accepted. People reading
this protocol would naturally consider that the error reject rate
can be fairly high and it is possible for a very lucky fake tag
to be successfully authenticated. From probability theory, one
can give the equations of false rejection rate PFR, and false
acceptance PFA:
PFR =
q∑
i=t+1
(
q
i
)
ηi(1− η)q−i (1)
PFA =
t∑
i=0
(
q
i
)
2−q (2)
It is clear from the equations that both PFR and PFA are
irrelevant to the lengths of the secret k, they are only relevant
to q, t and η. In the original HB+ protocol, a threshold of
t = ηq is suggested. However in Gilbert et al. [6], a table
describing the relations of security parameters and error rates
shows the default choice t = ηq gives an unacceptably high
false rejection rate. For example, when q = 60, η = 0.25,
k = 224, PFR can be as large as 0.43! It is hard to imagine
any practical scenario where a probability higher than 1% of
rejecting a legitimate tag could be tolerated.
Another obvious problem of implementing the HB+ proto-
col is the transmission costs of the q rounds communication.
Actually considering the high false rejection rate, a genuine tag
might need to run over q rounds to get authenticated. In each
round, a pack of three k-bit messages have to be transmitted.
Gilbert et al. [6] gave some description of the transmission
cost which shows the transmission cost of HB+ protocol with
previously proposed security parameters, q = 60, η = 0.25,
k = 224, will have to transmit at least 26,984 bits of data just
for a whole (q rounds) authentication. For the more secure
HB+ protocol with k = 512, there needs at least 61,500 bits
of data to be transmitted. All this calculation is not including
other necessary transmission overloads like the transmission
time intervals and error-checking code attached. So HB+
protocol is still impractical for current RFID systems.
III. THE HB-MP
′
PROTOCOL AND ITS WEAKNESS
A. The HB-MP
′
Protocol
HB-MP protocol is a variation of HB+ protocol. There is
an important step in developing the HB-MP protocol from
the HB+ protocol called the HB-MP
′
protocol. It is a direct
modification of HB+ but vulnerable to the man-in-middle
attack proposed by Gilbert et al. [5]. The HB-MP protocol
is an enhanced version of HB-MP
′
to resist such attack.
The protocol of HB-MP
′
is composed of q rounds. One of
which is depicted in Fig.2 and described as follows:
READER TAG
x = xk−1...x1x0x = xk−1...x1x0
a
b
Check if a · x = b · x
q·η failures are accepted
z = a · x⊕ v
Choose b/b · x = z
Fig. 2. A Round of HB-MP′ Protocol
Step 1. The reader chooses at random a k-bit binary vector
a, and sends it to the tag.
Step 2. The tag computes z as follows: z = a · x ⊕ v and
looks for a k-bit binary vector b such that b · x = z.
Step 3. The tag sends b to the reader.
Step 4. The reader checks whether b · x = a · x.
Munilla and Peinado [1] give a detailed explanation about
finding x knowing the vectors a and b is at least as difficult as
solving the LPN problem. The essential change made by the
HB-MP′ protocol is that the tag side takes the computation
load of picking the response b. In their paper, they give a
neat algorithm on picking b when η = 0.25:
Algorithm 1. Input: a, x. Output: b such that b·x = a·x⊕v,
where v = 1 with probability 1/4.
Computes z = a · x
Generates at random k-bit binary
vector b
If b · x = z
Sends b
else
Generates and sends a new random
k-bit vector b
end
From the algorithm, one can know that the possibility that
b · x 6= a · x is 0.5× 0.5 = 0.25, that means η = 0.25. If the
b is checked n times before it is sent, then η = 1/2n+1 In
Algorithm 2, we give a general form of n times checking on
b before sending it.
Algorithm 2. Input: a, x, n. Output: b such that
b · x = a · x⊕ v, where v = 1 with probability 1/2n+1.
Computes z = a · x
While n ≥ 1
Generates at random k-bit vector b
If b · x = z
Break
n = n− 1
end While
Sends b
end
n = 1, η = 0.25 and n = 2, η = 0.125 are both practical and
popular choices.
B. A Man-in-the middle Attack on the HB-MP
′
Protocol
HB-MP
′
is the prototype of HB-MP protocol but it is
vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack similar to the one
proposed by Gilbert et al. [5]. Munilla and Peinado [1] men-
tioned this type of attack on the HB-MP
′
protocol, however,
the attack was not described within their paper. Here we give
an example of such an attack. It is reasonably assumed that
READER TAG
x = xk−1...x1x0x = xk−1...x1x0
a
b′ = b⊕ δ
Check if a · x = b · x
q·η failures are accepted
z = a · x⊕ v
Choose b/b · x = z
Fig. 3. A Successful Active Attack against HB-MP′ Protocol
the adversary is capable of manipulating challenges sent by a
legitimate tag to a legitimate reader during the authentication
procedure, checking whether this manipulation results (or not)
in an authentication failure. The attack is illustrated in Fig.3
onto a single round of the HB+ protocol. The attacker chooses
a constant k-bit vector δ and use it to perturb the response
sent by a legitimate tag to the legitimate reader: b′ = b⊕δ for
each of the q rounds of authentication. If the authentication
process is successful, then it must be true that δ · x = 0 with
overwhelming probability. If authentication doesn’t succeed
then δ · x = 1 with overwhelming probability.
We use the same δ in all q rounds of the protocol. Accep-
tance or rejection by the reader would reveal one bit of secret
information x. To retrieve the k-bit secret x, it is enough to
repeat the full protocol k times for linearly independent δ ’s,
and to solve the resulting system. Conveniently, the attacker
can choose δs with a single non-zero bit and this non-zero bit
is different for each δ. Once x has been derived, the attacker
is able to impersonate the tag. Another side effect of the
disclosure of x is that the privacy of the tag’s identity is also
compromised.
IV. THE HB-MP PROTOCOL AND ITS WEAKNESS
A. The HB-MP Protocol
The HB-MP protocol is an enhancement of HB-MP
′
. With
the same notation of HB-MP
′
, there are some more notations:
The protocol also runs q rounds to achieve one authenti-
cation, one of which, the ith round, is depicted in Fig.4 and
described as follows:
Step 1. The reader chooses at random an m-bit binary vector
a and sends it to the tag.
m length of the message exchanged between the parties.
x, y k bits secret keys shared by the reader and the tag.
xm the m-bit binary vector consisting of the m least significant
bits of x.
a, b a, b are m-bit long in the following protocols
Rot(p, u) the bitwise left rotate operator. The operand p is rotated u
positions.
TABLE II
MORE NOTATIONS FOR HB-MP PROTOCOL
READER TAG
x = xk−1...x1x0
y = yk−1...y1y0
x = xk−1...x1x0
y = yk−1...y1y0
a
b
x = Rot(x, yi)
Check if a · xm = b · xm
x = Rot(x, yi)
z = a · xm ⊕ v
Choose b/b · xm = z
Fig. 4. The ith Round of HB-MP Protocol
Step 2. The tag computes x = Rot(x, yi), where yi is the
ith bit of the key y.
Step 3. The tag computes z as follows:
z = a · xm⊕ v (3)
and looks for a k-bit binary vector b such that b · xm = z.
Step 4. The tag sends b to the reader.
Step 5. The reader computes the x in the ith round as x =
Rot(x, yi), where yi is the ith bit of y.
Step 6. The reader checks if
a · xm = b · xm (4)
After q rounds, the reader trusts the tag is legitimate if the
failures are below q · η rounds.
B. A Man-in-the-middle Attack on the HB-MP Protocol
Defending against the man-in-the-middle attack as proposed
by Gilbert et al. has been considered in the HB-MP protocol,
hence the rotation of xm. But this rotation has its own
weakness. In the design of the HB-MP protocol, for every
new session, xm needs to be identical in the ith round. It is
not stated clearly about when to start and end an authentication
session. It is reasonable to suppose that when the tag enters
the electromagnetic field and starts to talk with the reader, an
authentication session begins and when the q-round enquiry is
finished or the tag departs from the electromagnetic field of the
reader, the authentication session ends. Since x = Rot(x, yi),
so xm in the first round of all the authentication sessions
should be the same. If the attacker pretends to be a valid
reader, he can initiate repetitive authentication sessions, ini-
tially restricted to the first round. The techniques used in last
section can then be exploited to reveal the tag’s first round
xm. If the attacker observes the ith round, he is able to reveal
the xm used in the ith round.
The reason why the protocol has to use the same xm be-
tween authentication sessions is the synchronisation problem.
If the value of x is updated to the rotated value after every
authentication session on both the reader and tag side, a new
reader will not be able to verify the updated tag and a valid
new tag can not be verified by the updated reader, since the
values of x stored in the reader and tags are not the same.
Unless all the readers and tags are updated at the same time
after every authentication session, which is expensive and
technically difficult, the synchronization problem forbids the
HB-MP protocols to change the xm.
Even if the synchronization problem is solved, the x is
updated in every authentication session. There is still a way to
conduct the man-in-the-middle attack. The length of x and y is
k, if in an authentication session, the protocol runs k rounds,
the x will be rotated p bits, here p is the number of ‘1’ in
y, so if the attacker runs the protocol for k times, namely k2
rounds, the x will be rotated p · k times and it is rotated back
to its initial value. so a repeat of xm happens again. Since
the proposed x is 512 bits, so 262,144 rounds will definitely
generate a repeated xm. It is an affordable attack.
V. AN IMPROVED HB-MP PROTOCOL
The vulnerability of this protocol stems from the predictable
repetition of xm, if the rotation is random in each round, the
repetition of xm is unpredictable, thus the attack is defended.
READER TAG
x = xk−1...x1x0
y and f(.)
x = xk−1...x1x0
y and f(.)
a
b
u = f(a, y)
x = Rot(x, u)
Check if a · xm = b · xm
u = f(a, y)
x = Rot(x, u)
z = a · xm ⊕ v
Choose b/b · xm = z
Fig. 5. The ith Round of the Improved HB-MP Protocol
The notations are same with the original HB-MP protocol
except a one way function f(.) and an intermediate value u =
f(a, y). Instead of using the default threshold ηq, we define the
threshold t. Because Gilbert et al. [6] cites the result of other
research, describing threshold ηq can cause unreasonably high
false rejection rate. The threshold t can be adjusted to a value
larger than ηq to reduce the false rejection rate, and retain
a low false acceptance rate at the same time. This improved
protocol also has q rounds and if the failures do not pass the
threshold t, the tag is authenticated successfully. The ith round
is depicted in Fig.5 and described as follows:
Step 1. The reader chooses at random a m-bit binary vector
a and send it to the tag.
Step 2. The reader and tag compute u = f(a, y) and x =
Rot(x, u). xm is selected as the first m-bits of current x.
Step 3. The tag computes z as follows:
z = a · xm⊕ v (5)
and looks for a m-bit binary vector b such that b · xm = z.
Step 4. The tag sends b to the reader.
Step 5. The reader computes the x in the ith round as x =
Rot(x, t) and selects xm from this x.
Step 6. The reader checks if
a · xm = b · xm (6)
By using the random number a, The improved protocol
makes the rotation of x unpredictable. An advantage of this
improvement is that the original form of the HB-MP protocol
is kept and the only change is the computation operated inside
the tag and reader. This protocol improves the HB-MP protocol
by making the rotation of the secret unpredictable to the
attacker.
VI. AN ABSTRACT FORM OF HB-MP+ PROTOCOL
The core idea of the improved protocol is to use some
additional random bits generated by the reader to randomize
the rotation. The evolutionary design idea from HB-MP′ to
HB-MP was to rotate the secret key x in each round. The
improved HB-MP protocol makes the rotation unpredictable
by adding randomness. If we extend the design idea a step
further, the essential part of defending against man-in-the-
middle attack is to use a random secret in each round, namely
a Round Key. The vulnerability of HB-MP comes from the
predictability of the round key. So if the focus of protocol
design points to the generation of a round key by using the ran-
dom bits and shared secrets, a new protocol can be proposed.
The HB-MP+ protocol we proposed is called in abstract form
because the one-way function f(.) is not concrete. HB-MP+
is also in accordance of the naming convention of HB-family
protocols. The HB-MP+ protocol also has adjustable threshold
t to improve the false rejection rate. Fig. 6 shows one round of
the HB-MP+ protocol. Step 1. The reader chooses at random
READER TAG
shared secret x and a
non-linear function f(.)
shared secret x and a
non-linear function f(.)
a
b
xs is the round key,
xs = f(a, x),
Check if a · xs = b · xs
xs is the round key,
xs = f(a, x),
z = a · xs ⊕ v
Choose b/b · xs = z
Fig. 6. The ith Round of the Abstract HB-MP+ Protocol
a m-bit binary vector a and send it to the tag.
Step 2. The reader and tag compute the round key xs =
f(a, x). f(.) is the one-way function.
Step 3. The tag computes z as follows:
z = a · xs ⊕ v (7)
and looks for a m-bit binary vector b such that b · xs = z.
Step 4. The tag sends b to the reader.
Step 5. The reader computes the xs = f(a, x), using the
secret x and random number a.
Step 6. The reader checks if
a · xs = b · xs (8)
The notations are almost the same with the improved HB-
MP protocol, except that the non-linear function f(.) is the
abstraction from Rot(.). Since rotation is a linear operation,
the output of f(.) should be less predictable. Using the bit
operations, it is easy to implement a low-cost non-linear
function f(.). As f(.) does not necessarily use rotation, the
bits of x are not mentioned. The round key xs is generated
by a random number a and shared secret x. There is no need
for another shared secret y and because the x is not changed,
there are no synchronisation problems between the readers and
tags.
VII. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE
HB-MP+ PROTOCOL
A. Security Analysis
The improved HB-MP protocol and HB-MP+ protocol is
based on the HB-MP protocol. Since the way of transmitting
messages is the same with the HB-MP protocol. The analysis
in Munilla and Peinado [1] also applies to the HB-MP+
protocol: A passive attacker has to solve the LPN problem
to reveal the secret of tags(x, more specifically).
In the design of these two protocols, it is very important
that the round key is calculated by random challenge a and
the secret x. Since a is randomly generated by the reader and
stored in the reader, the attacker cannot either predict a or
modify a. If an attacker modifies a to a′ to cheat the tag, the
tag side will use a′ to generate the round key xs, which is
not the same round key generated at the reader side since the
reader still uses its own a. Thus the attacker cannot get any
valuable response from the tag.
It is necessary to define the attacker’s aim when we start to
talk about the attack. In the two protocols we propose, the tag
does not authenticate the reader. In other word, the tag does
not care who is challenging it, it just gives back responses
according to the challenge. So the attacker’s meaningful aim
is to fool the reader to authenticate a fake tag or to reveal
the secret x. Man-in-the-middle attack presented in Gilbert
et al. [5] can reveal the secret of the target protocols. To
illustrate how our protocols defend against the man-in-the-
middle attack, We give a model describing the ability of an
active attacker. Let A be an adversary, who can intercept
the communication between the reader and the tag. A can
also pretend a reader to challenge the tag. A can block and
modify the messages sent both by the reader and the tags.
Finally A can fool the reader to answer multiply responses
for a single challenge in each round (which is unlikely to
happen to a reader with the predefined procedure to handle
the information received). We only illustrate the attack to the
HB-MP+ protocol, which is the mature protocol in this paper.
Fig.7 shows an assumed man-in-the-middle attack launched
by the the attacker A against the HB-MP+ protocol.
b′i = bi ⊕ δ
A knows δ · xs = 0 or δ · xs = 1
Attacker A
a
a
a
a
A gets a
A sends a to the
tag q times, gets
q responses bi,1 ≤
i ≤ q
A modify bi into
b′
1
b′
2
b′n
b1
b2
bq
READER TAG
A sends all b′i to
the reader at one
time
Reader gives the answer
(Accepted or Rejected 0/1)
Fig. 7. Assumed Man-in-the-middle Attack on HB-MP+ Protocol
If A is the man-in-the-middle and attacking the HB-MP+
protocol, A gets the challenge a sent by an authentic reader,
then A pretends to be a reader and challenge the tag with the
same a q times. A receives q responses bi (1 ≤ i ≤ q) from
the tag, A modified the responses into b′i = bi⊕δ (1 ≤ i ≤ q)
and gives them back to the reader at one time. A gets the
answer(accepted or rejected) from the reader. Then A knows
that xs·δ = 1 or xs·δ = 0 with high probability, A can retrieve
a bit of the round-key xs generated by a. If the attacker can
fool the reader to answer the challenge a continuously, the
attacker can even reveal the whole xs. However the f(.) is
a good one-way function, A cannot retrieve x from xs and
a. Since reader is generating challenge a randomly, which
makes A unable to predict a, we can conclude that A can
only retrieve the previous round keys but not the secret x
(since f(.) is a good one-way function). For a fresh challenge
a, A cannot give the correct response back to fool the reader.
So the HB-MP+ protocol is secure against the active attacks
similar to the one in [5].
For the improved HB-MP protocols presented in this paper,
if A can derive enough rotations of x, A is able to find x at
the end. Fortunately, in reality this assumed attack is unlikely
to happen, the communication between RFID and the reader
is predefined and sequenced. A normal reader will not tolerate
more than one responses for a single challenge. State machine
inside the reader will also start a fresh challenge after a q-
round authentication session. To response one challenge so
many times is the assumed condition to facilitate the attack.
Another attack needs to be noticed is that the adversary can
always response b = a. The reader needs to check that the
response should be different from the challenge each round.
B. Performance Analysis
Because the HB-MP+ protocol uses round keys, the secret
is updated in each round, so m (the size of the round key) does
not need to be as large as suggested in Gilbert et al. [6]. In
their paper the authors suggested that k = 512 and η = 0.25
is good enough. In HB-MP+ protocol, the secret x can be 512
bits while m can be significantly smaller. m = 224 offers a
security level of 52-bit [6], which should be enough for the
round key.
Another significant reduce of transmission cost comes from
the fact that HB-MP+ protocol transmits two messages instead
of three each round. This will cut 1/3 transmission cost
comparing to the HB+ protocol.
Despite the improvement on the performance, HB-MP+
protocol still suffers the same performance penalties with
the HB+ protocol. It still needs to run many rounds and
there are still too much data needs to be transmitted for an
authentication session. The transmission cost is too high for
current RFID systems.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper a vulnerability of the HB-MP protocol that
may enable a successful man-in-the-middle attack has been
identified, An enhanced version of HB-MP protocol is pro-
posed that eliminates the vulnerability and keeps the simplicity
of the original protocol. An abstract form of the HB-MP+
protocol introduces the idea of random round keys is also
proposed. This paper also improves the algorithms of picking
random responses and gives adjustable threshold to reduce
the false rejection rates. The abstract form of the HB-MP+
protocol requires concrete the one-way function f(.), however
this is thought within the capabilities of RFID devices and
comparable with the Rot(.) function used in HB-MP.
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